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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-22-303. 
The foregoing provision is attached as Exhibit A. 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
The proceeding before the Third District Court was an action for negligence and 
enforcement of a judgment against Nationwide. West American is the real party in 
interest which brought a claim for reimbursement of PIP expenses in its own name and, 
for recovery of all other losses, in the name of its insured Ted John Speros (hereinafter 
"Plaintiffs" or "West American"), plaintiffs and appellants, against Nationwide Mutual 
Insurance Company (hereinafter "Nationwide") and its insureds Kimberly Fricke and 
Jeffrey Hiatt, defendants and appellees, Civil number 990910670. (R. 1). The primary 
issue presented to the district court was whether Nationwide owed reimbursement to West 
American under its insurance policy containing personal injury protection coverage 
("PIP") and whether it owed indemnification to Jeffrey Hiatt under its liability coverage. 
(R. 1-8). 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(j), 
UTAH CODE ANN. (1953, as amended). 
COURSE OF PROCEEDING AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
On December 6, 1999 a Default Judgment was entered against Jeffrey Hiatt as a 
result of Nationwide's refusal to provide him with a defense. (R. 26-27). On December 
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8, 1999, notice of default was provided to Nationwide. (R. 28). On December 15, 1999 
Plaintiff filed its motion for summary judgment arguing that Nationwide was obligated to 
provide indemnification for Hiatt arising from the default judgment. (R. 33). Nationwide 
opposed the motion claiming that it was not bound by the finding because it had decided 
that Hiatt was not an insured based on its alleged investigation. (R. 44). The court's order 
denied Plaintiffs motion and the court refused to provide a written ruling. (R. 106, 117). 
Plaintiff renewed its motion for summary judgment on February 15, 2001 again 
demanding that the trial court comply with Rules 56(d) and Rule 52(a). (R. 162). 
Nationwide filed a cross motion on April 11, 2001 insisting that its internal decision 
relating to whether it owed coverage was dispositive (e.g., R. 185) and that Plaintiff 
lacked standing. (R. 181). The Court granted Nationwide's cross-motion dismissing 
Nationwide and again refused to provide a written ruling. (R. 247, 288). Finally, Fricke 
moved for summary judgment on August 13, 2001 asserting that her affidavit was 
dispositive of her negligence and that a jury could only conclude that she was non-
negligent. (R. 276). Plaintiffs opposed this motion on the basis that Fricke failed to 
prove the non-existence of material facts or that a jury could only draw one conclusion. 
(R. 306). The court granted Fricke's motion on January 15, 2002. Plaintiffs filed their 
Notice of Appeal on February 11, 2002. (R. 336). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
A. It is undisputed that all rulings made by the district court were made 
under authority granted by Rule 56, and the questions are all founded upon the question 
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of whether the legal determinations of the district court were proper. REVIEWED FOR 
CORRECTNESS. Rinderknecht v. Luck, 965 P.2d 564 (Utah App. 1998) ("This appeal 
is from a summary judgment, which is granted only when 'there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 'Inasmuch as a challenge to summary judgment presents for 
review conclusions of law only, because, by definition, summary judgments do not 
resolve factual issues, this Court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without 
according deference to the trial court's legal conclusions.' Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 
497, 499 (Utah 1989) (per curiam). Accord Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. State Farm 
Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 925 P.2d 1270, 1272-73 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)."). 
B. Was Nationwide obligated to indemnify Jeffrey Hiatt (i.e., pay the 
default judgment which settled all issues of liability and the amount thereof) where it had 
notice of the allegations contained in the complaint but failed and refused to provide a 
defense? Reviewed for correctness. 
C. Did Nationwide waive all of its contractual defenses by refusing to 
defend and indemnify Jeffrey Hiatt? Reviewed for correctness. 
D. Was Jeffrey Hiatt a "permissive user" of the vehicle insured by 
Nationwide? Reviewed for correctness. 
E. Did Nationwide's "intentional acts" exclusion apply to the facts? 
Reviewed for correctness. 
F. If Nationwide's exclusion applied, is it void because it conflicts with the 
public policy expressed by modern compulsory auto insurance? Reviewed for 
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correctness. 
G. Does West American have standing to sue Nationwide? Reviewed for 
correctness. 
H. Is West American a third-party beneficiary of Nationwide's insurance 
policy because compulsory auto insurance was adopted by the Utah legislature for the 
protection of the public, not just the insured tortfeasor? Reviewed for correctness. 
I. Did the trial court correctly determine that a reasonable jury could only 
reach one conclusion regarding Fricke's negligence? Reviewed for correctness. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
a. Defendant Nationwide Insurance Company insured Kimberly Fricke's vehicle. 
Defendant Nationwide's Answer at f^ 1. 
b. Jeffrey Hiatt was a permissive passenger in the vehicle insured by Nationwide. 
c. Jeffrey Hiatt grabbed the steering wheel causing Ms. Fricke to lose control of 
the vehicle and collide with the vehicle insured by West American. 
d. The collision of the above-mentioned insured vehicle with Ted Speros's 
vehicle was the physical and proximate cause of the damages suffered by West 
American's insured. See Complaint, Default Certificate and Default Judgment. 
e. The aforementioned collision resulted from Jeffrey B. Hiatt's negligence while 
a passenger in the insured vehicle and, thus, a permissive user of the insured vehicle. See 
Complaint, Default Certificate and Default Judgment. 
f. Nationwide insured all permissive users of the vehicle used by Jeffrey B. Hiatt. 
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See UTAH CODE ANN. §31A-22-303. 
g. Nationwide claimed that Jeffrey Hiatt was not a "permissive user" or, if he 
was, his actions took him outside the coverage of its policy through its "intentional acts" 
exclusion. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This appeal concerns the liability of a liability insurer toward an innocent third-
party who is injured as a result of the negligence of a passenger who unexpectedly grabs 
the steering wheel. West American argues that the loss should be borne by the insurer of 
the vehicle used to cause the injury to the innocent victim. 
Nationwide determined that Hiatt was not an insured and, thus, not entitled to a 
defense based on its own assertions and its own self-serving investigation. It did not 
make its determination based upon the allegations contained in the complaint. The trial 
court failed to explain why it felt Nationwide's decision was correct; instead it ruled 
Nationwide was able to make the determination and implicitly ruled that Nationwide's 
determination was binding on the court. 
As a result of Nationwide's refusal to defend Hiatt based upon its refusal to 
determine its duty to defend under the allegations of the complaint, a default judgment 
was entered against Hiatt. Even though Nationwide's contractual obligation is to answer 
for its insured's legal liability, Nationwide refused to be responsible for the default 
entered because of Nationwide's unlawful refusal to defend based on nothing more than 
its own self-interested assertion that Hiatt was not an "insured." 
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Nationwide never set forth any cogent reasoning to support its assertion that Hiatt 
was not an insured despite his undisputed permissive use; instead, it baldly asserted that 
Hiatt's act of grabbing the steering wheel exceeded the scope of his permission . . . 
somehow for some undisclosed reason. "Using" is much broader than operating and the 
legislature has not narrowed the scope of "use" so long as there is a permissive 
component. Therefore, Nationwide's assertions are without merit and it must answer for 
the default judgment it caused to be entered against Hiatt. 
West American is entitled to reimbursement as a third-party beneficiary and under 
principles of subrogation. West American may force the insurer to pay which should pay 
for a loss despite poorly-understood phrases such as "privity." 
The intentional acts exclusion is not permitted by section 303 as against victims of 
automobile accidents. Although a public policy exists that insureds who cause damage 
intentionally should not benefit from insurance, there is a greater public policy that 
victims be reimbursed. The secondary public policy discouraging intentional damage can 
be achieved by recognizing liability carriers' right to pursue their insureds for breach of 
contract or indemnification (the remedy is not "subrogation" as Nationwide insists). 
If the intentional acts exclusion is enforceable against the victim, it nevertheless 
has no application to the facts of this case. Hiatt grabbed the steering wheel. This is a 
voluntary movement as much changing lanes without looking is a voluntary movement. 
But a voluntary movement does not render negligence intentional so as to protect insurers 
like Nationwide from their contractual obligations. 
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Lastly, Fricke's affidavit did not require only one reasonable conclusion. A jury 
could have disbelieved her self-serving testimony. Simply stated, when Fricke claimed 
that there was nothing she could have done to prevent her vehicle from crossing into 
oncoming traffic, a reasonable jury could find that she is undeserving of belief. 
Therefore, her affidavit was insufficient to support a summary judgment. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. HIATT WAS INSURED BY NATIONWIDE UNDER FRICKE'S 
POLICY. 
Nationwide was obligated to "insure" Hiatt. Section 303 provides the statutory 
obligation borne by Nationwide: 
(ii) (A) if it is an owner's policy, designate by appropriate reference 
all the motor vehicles on which coverage is granted, insure the 
person named in the policy, insure any other person using any 
named motor vehicle with the express or implied permission of 
the named insured . . . . 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-303(l)(a)(ii)(A). 
Thus, an owner's policy must insure permissive users of the cars 
covered by the policy. This is a requirement, as evidenced by the 
use of the word "shall." 
Universal Underwriters v. State Farm. 925 P.2d 1270 (Utah App. 1996) (emphasis 
added). 
A. Jeffrey Hiat t was a "Permissive User" 
Nationwide acknowledges that Jeffrey Hiatt was riding as a passenger with the 
express permission of Kimberly Fricke (R. 45, 62-63), but it simply asserts that the 
statutory term "using" does not extend to Jeffrey Hiatt's alleged actions in grabbing the 
steering wheel because he did not have express or implied permission to grab the steering 
wheel. Nationwide failed to explain why Hiatt's actions were outside the scope of his 
permissive use, what process it purportedly employed to come to its conclusion, or what 
contractual or statutory language it purportedly relied upon. Instead it insisted, and the 
trial court ruled that Nationwide was entitled to make that decision, and the court would 
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not second-guess its bald conclusion. (R. 185). 
The term "using" is broad enough to encompass grabbing the steering wheel; 
therefore, Nationwide owes indemnification to Jeffrey Hiatt. See, e.g.. Viking Ins. Co. Of 
Wisconsin v. Coleman, 927 P.2d 661 (Utah App. 1996). Nationwide's effective assertion 
that its coverage would only be triggered when a passenger grabs a steering wheel after 
obtaining permission is absurd. If such were the law, insurers would never be obligated 
to provide any coverage to permissive users because named insureds never provide 
permission for negligence. By definition, negligence encompasses actions that are not 
planned for or studied making advance permission relating to negligent conduct 
impossible. A passenger who opens a door at an inopportune moment, a passenger who 
distracts the driver by words or deeds, a passenger who injures himself falling out of the 
vehicle while intentionally drunk are all "permissive users" entitled to various benefits 
from the insurer of the vehicle used at the time. 
The legislature did not limit the "scope" of the permissive use; rather, it mandated 
that permissive users be insured by the owner's insurer. Neither Nationwide nor the 
Court may read language into the statute under the guise of construction. Nationwide's 
assertions relating to the scope of permissive use is without merit because Nationwide 
may not provide less coverage to those required to be insured than is mandated by the 
legislature.1 
1
 The insurer may avoid assuming the risk of loss associated with a particular 
activity or place by using "language which clearly and unmistakably communicates to the 
insured the specific circumstances under which the expected coverage will not be 
provided" unless legislative intent would be undermined. Village Inn Apartments v. State 
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An argument could be made that although Hiatt was "using" the vehicle with the 
named insured's permission,2 he was not authorized to "operate"3 the vehicle. The courts 
in Utah's sister jurisdictions are not clear on when or if a person who grabs a steering 
wheel is an "operator" as that term is used in a wide variety of situations.4 Apparently, 
steering-wheel-grabbing is common.5 In any event, Utah's statute does not use the term 
"operate" when setting forth an insurer's obligations. The legislature used the broad term 
"using" rather than the narrower term "operating" advisedly. 
Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 790 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah App. 1990). 
2
 See, e.g.. New York Funeral Chapels, Inc. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 33 F. Supp. 
2d 294, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (analyzing insurer's argument that permissive use did not 
extend to smashing someone's hand in the door while closing it and holding that under 
New York law, "use" of a motor vehicle involves more than merely driving a car). 
3
 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-12a-104(7) (defining "operator" as one who is in 
actual physical control of a vehicle). 
4
 The public policies and express purposes of automobile liability insurance is not 
the same as life insurance or homeowners' insurance. See, e.g., Elton v. Bankers Life & 
Casualty Company, 516 P.2d 165 (Utah 1973) ("That cases decided under workmen's 
compensation laws should be dispositive here, as plaintiff contends, cannot be accepted as 
controlling since the purposes, public policies, legal principles, statutory and contractual 
provisions involved in workmen's compensation statutes vis a vis commercial insurance 
policies are so incompatible as to lend little or no weight in attempting to establish an 
award in the one case as precedent for a decision or judgment in the other."). 
5
 See, e ^ , State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Larsen, 377 N.E.2d 1218 (111. 1978); 
U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Hokanson, 584 P.2d 1264 (Kan. App. 1978); U.S. Fire 
Insurance Co. v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 772 S.W2d 218 (1989); Gibbs v. National 
Gen. Ins. Co., 938 S.W.2d 600 (1997); North Pac. Ins. Co. v. Christensen, 143 Wn.2d 43 
(2001); Harrison v. Tomes, 956 S.W.2d 268 (Mo. 1997); Meshbesher v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins., 157 Wis.2d 473 (Ct.App. 1990); US Fire Ins. v. United Service Auto., 772 
S.W.2d 218 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1989); West Bend Mut. Ins. v. Mil. Mut. Ins. Co., 384 
N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 1986). 
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In sum, Jeffrey Hiatt was using the insured vehicle with the permission of 
Kimberly Fricke. (R. 286). There is no statutory basis to take Hiatt's subsequent actions 
outside the scope of the term "using" despite Fricke's bald conclusion that Hiatt 
"intentionally" grabbed the steering wheel. Therefore Hiatt was "insured" by 
Nationwide. 
II. BECAUSE NATIONWIDE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO 
DEFEND HIATT, BUT REFUSED, THE JUDGMENT ENTERED 
AGAINST HIM IS BINDING ON NATIONWIDE. 
In McCarty v. Parks, the Utah Supreme Court set forth the general rule that an 
insurance company which refuses to defend its insured is bound by a judgment that is 
entered against the insured. The general rule applies to this case. 
The Court also set forth an exception from this general rule which applied in that 
case, but does not apply to this case because Nationwide was a party to this litigation. 
Nationwide insists that it was not bound by the results of the default because it 
misunderstands its obligation. It is obligated to answer for the "legal liability" of its 
insureds. Hiatt was an insured and his legal liability was conclusively determined by the 
default judgment. 
It is true that as a general rule when an insurer, whose policy requires 
it to defend its insured, receives notice of a suit against him and is 
allowed an opportunity to defend, but refuses, is bound by the 
findings and judgment therein. 
McCarty v. Parks v. Royal Glove Ins. Co.. 564 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977). Nationwide 
ignores the general rule and, instead, asserts the applicability of an exception to the 
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general rule despite the lack of any factual similarity between this case and the case 
which set forth the exception: 
However, this does not extend to matters collateral or immaterial to 
the essential issues involved in the case, but is limited to those 
necessary to determination of the controversy between the immediate 
parties. Consequently, an insurance company which is not a party 
to the suit, nor concerned with the issues of liability [6] therein, is 
not bound by such collateral recitals in the findings. It should be 
afforded an opportunity to raise and have determined the issue as to 
its own liability, so long as doing so, is not inconsistent with the 
findings on material issues which were determined between the 
plaintiff and defendant. 
McCartv v. Parks v. Royal Glove Ins. Co., 564 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977). Nationwide is 
and always has been a party to this litigation. Its contractual liability is exactly 
coextensive with Hiatt's legal liability. The issue of Hiatt's legal liability is in no sense 
collateral to the issue of Nationwide's indemnity obligation. Therefore, the exception to 
the general rule set forth in McCarty is not applicable to this case. See Jensen v. Eddy, 
514 P.2d 1142, 1143 (Utah 1973) ("If the reason for the rule is not present, the rule does 
not apply" and conversely if the reason for the exception to the general rule is not present, 
the exception does not apply); see also (R. 117 attached hereto as Exhibit B). 
Nationwide objects to how the findings of Hiatt's negligence affect its affirmative 
defenses. Nationwide had the opportunity to raise its affirmative defenses, but it refused 
6
 Nationwide was concerned with the issues of its insured's liability for negligence 
because all of its actions and conclusions are premised upon its selfish and unfounded 
factual determination that Jeffrey Hiatt's actions were "intentional," whereas the trial 
court's entry of a default and default judgment conclusively found Hiatt "negligent." 
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to do so. If it had believed that its mere assertions were valid, it should have raised them7 
in its answer filed on behalf of Hiatt or in a declaratory judgment (cross-claim) against 
Hiatt. It failed to raise its asserted defenses or otherwise protect its asserted lack of 
liability based on the purported applicability of an exclusion. 
Hiatt was completely abandoned by Nationwide. He permitted a default judgment 
to be entered against him for the full amount of Speros's damages. 
Furthermore, "it is well settled that, at least after a denial of liability 
by an insurer, the insured may enter into a settlement with a third 
party without prejudicing its rights against the insurer." Bunge Corp. 
v. London & Overseas Ins. Co., 394 F.2d 496, 497 (2d Cir. 1968). 
Therefore, "an assured is entitled to exercise the judgment of a 
prudent uninsured person in compromising the claim when the 
insurer repudiates coverage." Simon v. Maryland Cas. Co., 353 F.2d 
608, 612 (5th Cir. 1965). Indeed, when an insurer disclaims liability 
on the basis of noncoverage, not only may the insured bring an 
action against the insurer, but in addition "the insurer is bound by 
any reasonable compromise or settlement made by the insured." 
Waugh v. American Cas. Co., 190 Kan. 725, 378 P.2d 170, 177 
(Kan. 1963). 
Gibbs M. Smith. Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 949 P.2d 337 (Utah 1997); 
see also Christiansen v. Holiday Rent-A-Car. 845 P.2d 1316 (Utah App. 1992) 
(explaining that an insurer that improperly denies coverage is liable for the full amount of 
the judgment entered against the insured and explaining further that "[i]nsureds and 
injured parties alike may need the possibility of an [equitable] assignment and covenant 
7
 See, e.g., Draughon v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y. 771 P.2d 1105, 1108 (Utah App. 
1989) (explaining that any exceptions or conditions which would deny insured relief, take 
the insured out of the indemnity provisions, or render provisions inoperative, are matters 
of defense, and the burden thereof rests upon the insurer); LPS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. 
Co.. 765 P.2d 857, 858; Whitlock v. Old Am. Ins. Co., 442 P.2d 26, 27 (1968); Browning 
v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. 72 P.2d 1060, 1073 (Utah 1937). 
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not to execute as a weapon against insurer misconduct surrounding claims made under the 
policy. Such misconduct has been found to include an insurer's refusal to defend an 
insured, a failure to promptly notify an insured that its coverage is being cancelled, and a 
refusal to pay a valid claim."). 
Nationwide was confused regarding its obligations to the permissive user of its 
vehicle. Its duty to defend did not depend on its own selfish conclusions regarding 
Hiatt's intent. Rather: 
An insurer's duty to defend is determined by reference to the 
allegations in the underlying complaint. When those allegations, if 
proved, could result in liability under the policy, then the insurer has 
a duty to defend. 
Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Const.. Inc., 1999 UT 69 1f 8, 983 P.2d 575. 
(5) A policy containing motor vehicle liability coverage imposes on 
the insurer the duty to defend, in good faith, any person insured 
under the policy against any claim or suit seeking damages which 
would be payable under the policy. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-22-303(5). 
The insurer must make a good faith determination based on all the 
facts known to it, or which by reasonable efforts could be discovered 
by it, that there is no potential liability under the policy. * * * 
This means that there are no disputed facts which if proved by the 
plaintiff at trial would result in liability under the policy. However, 
this does not mean that the insurer can simply say, "We don't 
believe that the plaintiff can prove what he is alleging."[8] The 
insurance contract includes the duty to defend even if the allegations 
in a suit are groundless, false, or fraudulent. The question is whether 
the allegations, if proved, could result in liability under the policy. 
8
 The law is that the insurer cannot simply say that it does not believe the 
allegations, but Nationwide did exactly that. (R. 185). 
14 
Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc, v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.. 714 P.2d 1143, 
1146 (Utah 1986). 
If the failure to defend causes the insured to incur a judgment he 
would not otherwise have suffered, the insurer should bear 
responsibility for the judgment, even if it exceeds the policy limits or 
if the third party's claim does not come within the coverage of 
the policy. This is so because the failure to defend caused the 
insured to incur a judgment he would not otherwise have suffered, 
and in this rare[9] instance the insured should recover the full 
judgment as damages for the insurer's breach of its duty to defend 
rather than as damages for breach of its duty to indemnify. 
Ashley, Bad Faith Actions § 4.07 (citations omitted). 
The trial court entered a default against Hiatt for his failure to respond to 
Plaintiffs' complaint within twenty days of service. Rule 55 dictates that the factual 
issues raised in a complaint (i.e., the fact of Jeffrey B. Hiatt's negligence) are settled by 
the entry of a default certificate. Subsequent to the entry of default, the Court properly 
entered a default judgment which settled the amount of Hiatt's liability. 
Utah's appellate courts have been very clear about the effect of default as opposed 
to default judgment: "Defendant's failure to answer and ensuing default. •. require 
the court to accept the factual allegations as true, but the court [should] enter judgment 
as requested only if it determined those facts established an actionable claim." Stevens v. 
Collard, 837 P.2d 593, 596 n.5 (Utah App. 1992); see also Skanchv v. Calcados Ortope, 
952 P.2d 1071 (Utah 1998). 
Because the allegations in Plaintiffs complaint are true, as a matter of law, Hiatt 
9
 Unfortunately, situations such as this are not as rare as they should be. 
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did not intentionally injure Ted Speros; rather, the injuries and damages occurred as a 
result of Mr. Hiatt's negligence.10 Thus, Nationwide owes liability coverage and full 
indemnification to Hiatt who permissively used the vehicle insured by Nationwide. See 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-303. 
Nationwide must pay West American the full amount of the Default Judgment 
because the allegations which have been accepted as true read as follows: 
11. Cumulatively or alternatively, on or about January 1, 1998 at or 
about 1300 East and 1976 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, Defendant 
Hiatt used or operated a vehicle in a negligent and careless manner 
causing it to collide with a 1995 Honda Civic operated by Plaintiff 
Speros. 
12. As a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid conduct on the part 
of the Defendants, Plaintiff Speros's vehicle was damaged in the 
sum of $11,514.65, and Speros was deprived of its use during its 
repair sustaining rental car expenses in the sum of $499.70. 
13. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' negligence as 
aforesaid, Speros, the driver of the insured vehicle at the time of the 
accident, suffered physical injuries and incurred PIP expenses in the 
sum of $2,769.25. 
Complaint (R. 3); see also Default Judgment (R. 26). The factual allegations relating to 
Hiatt's negligence and damages proximately caused thereby gave rise to the trial court's 
entry of a default judgment. Because Nationwide was obligated to defend Hiatt, but 
refused because "Nationwide determined that he was not an insured" (e.g., R. 220), it is 
10
 "Where any of the claims alleged against an insured are withing the coverage of 
the policy, an insurer who has wrongfully refused to defend the insured cannot avail itself 
subsequently of the defense that the injuries or damages were actually caused by a 
tortious act that was excluded from such policy coverage. . . ." 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 103 
(R. 93). 
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bound by the default judgment and the factual determinations which arose from the 
default judgment's entry.11 
III. NATIONWIDE'S INTENTIONAL ACTS EXCLUSION IS NOT 
ENFORCEABLE AGAINST VICTIMS. 
Ted John Speros suffered damage when Fricke's car collided with his car. 
Nationwide insists that the collision was caused by Hiatt having grabbed the steering 
wheel and that this was the sole proximate cause of the accident. Nationwide concluded 
that because it asserts grabbing the steering wheel is "intentional" and because its policy 
has an intentional acts exclusion, it owed no coverage to Hiatt and, thus, owes nothing to 
Speros and West American. 
First, Nationwide's exclusion is not enforceable against West American. 
Automobile insurance is mandatory under the law because the legislature decided that 
insurance was necessary for the protection of the public.12 It has been explained that 
legislation, such as Utah's Financial Responsibility Act: 
[WJarrants evaluating questions relating to the existence of 
coverage for intentional harms from the vantage point of an 
injured person rather than resolving such issues on the basis of 
The remaining issues, except, partially, Nationwide's obligation of direct 
reimbursement of PIP expenses to West American in intercompany arbitration, may be 
rendered moot if the Court enforces the judgment because West American would thereby 
be made whole. 
12
 Mandatory automobile insurance was adopted in order to protect the members 
of the driving public who are injured: "This legislative action [addition of the no-fault 
statute to the safety responsibility act] reflected a public policy requiring minimum 
coverage to protect innocent victims of automobile accidents." Farmers Ins. Exch. v. 
Call 712 P.2d 231, 234 (Utah 1985). 
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whether the insured intended to cause the loss. 
ROBERT KEETON & ALAN L WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW, § 5(3) (2d ed. 1988).13 
Nationwide failed to consider this issue at all. Because automobile insurance is 
intended to protect the public, Nationwide's attempt to foist loss on members of the 
public based upon its exclusion undermines the express legislative intent. See, e.g.. 
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Roberts. 134 S.E.2d 654 (N.C. 1964) (holding that 
deliberate driving of car against pedestrian did not obviate the insurer's obligation to 
provide compulsory liability insurance benefits to victim because the statutory and public 
policy prevails over insurer's asserted exclusion). Utah's section 303 does not provide 
for exclusions relating to intentional acts; therefore, the Court must find that such an 
exclusion is unlawful as it affects the protection intended to be provided for victims. 
Second, a passenger's act of grabbing the steering wheel does not fit within the 
parameters of the intentional acts exclusion even if it were valid. In life insurance cases, 
the courts use an "expectation" standard as contrasted with the "foreseeability" standard 
which is a component of negligence law's proximate causation. 
By employing an "expectation" standard in determining if an event is 
accidental, Hoffman [v. Life Ins. Co. ofN. Am., 669 P.2d 410 (Utah 
1983)] imposes a high threshold of likelihood of injury or death for 
an event to qualify as a nonaccident. "Expected" is a term that 
"'implies a high degree of certainty.'" . . . "The 'unexpected event' 
13
 See also Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist 773 P.2d 
1382 (Utah 1989) "While a promisor may assert the voidness of the underlying contract 
as a defense in an action by a third-party beneficiary, it may not assert against that 
beneficiary a mere breach of the contract by the promisee. As Corbin states, 'Wrongful 
acts of the promisee, subsequent to the making of the contract, that would greatly affect 
his own right, may not affect the beneficiary's right at all.' Corbin at § 818."). 
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standard . . . as to what constitutes an accident includes not only 
death resulting from conduct of the insured which is negligent, 
but also death resulting from an insured's conduct which is 
reckless." 
Hardy v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 787 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1990). In applying these 
principles to the facts, the court noted the longstanding drug use of the deceased insured 
and noted that: 
[B]ecause Hardy knew that his continued [drug] abuse would result 
in death at some time, his act was reckless and indicated bad 
judgment. We cannot assume, however, that Hardy intended or 
expected to die on each occasion when he took drugs simply because 
he failed to heed the warnings of others that he should avoid taking 
narcotics. 
Id. Similarly, Hiatt could have foreseen that some problems might result from grabbing 
the steering wheel, and reaching over and grabbing the steering wheel is a voluntary 
action. However, it does not follow that all voluntary actions are "intentional" acts for 
purposes of automobile liability insurance. The Court may not ratify Nationwide's 
speculative assumption that he intended to collide with Speros's vehicle just because he 
voluntarily grabbed the steering wheel. 
IV. WEST AMERICAN HAS STANDING TO COMPEL 
NATIONWIDE TO PERFORM ITS DUTIES DESPITE THE 
BANAL PHRASE "PRIVITY OF CONTRACT." 
The right of subrogation does not depend on contractual privity. The right is based 
on equity14 and is a tool designed to require the party to bear the loss which should bear 
As explained above: 
The right to subrogation[] does not depend on contractual 
relationships, as its purpose is to "work out an equitable adjustment 
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the loss. 
The right of legal subrogation is not a matter of contract; it does not 
arise from any contractual relationship between the parties, but takes 
place as a matter of equity, with or without an agreement to that 
effect. The right of legal subrogation is not dependent on privity 
nor is it founded on, or dependent on, contract or on the absence of 
contract, but is independent of any contractual relations between the 
parties. Likewise, the right does not depend on the act of the 
creditor, but may be independent of him and also of the debtor. 
However, although the right of subrogation does not flow from a 
contract expressed or legally implied, it may be dependent on a 
contract in the sense that it may grow out of conditions resulting 
from the due observance of a contract. 
Wasatch Bank v. Surety Ins. Co. Of California. 703 P.2d 298 (Utah 1985); see also 
Auerbach Co. v. Key Sec. Police. Inc.. 680 P.2d 740 (Utah 1984) (explaining that a one 
who has a judgment against a judgment debtor (i.e., a judgment creditor) may enforce the 
contractual rights of the judgment debtor). What this means is that West American's 
right to recover from Nationwide under its contract grows out of conditions set forth in 
Nationwide's contract. If the judgment creditor [Hiatt] was entitled to be indemnified 
under the insurance contract, West American may collect under the contract from the 
debtor [Nationwide]. Insofar as the intentional acts exclusion is void as to victims while 
potentially enforceable against Hiatt himself under an indemnity theory,15 Nationwide 
between the parties by securing the ultimate discharge of a debt by 
the person who, in equity and in good conscience, ought to pay it. 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197, 1202 (Utah 1980). 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Northwestern National Ins. Co.. 912 P.2d 983 
(Utah 1996). 
15
 If Nationwide proved the facts it asserts, the insured's breach of the contract 
would obligate him to repay Nationwide the sums that Nationwide is obligated to pay to 
West American. See Ambassador Insurance Company v. Montes. 388 A.2d 603, 606 
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may pursue Hiatt to recover the sums it believes are excluded — if it could prove its mere 
assertions. 
Utah law clearly recognizes an insurer's right to bring a subrogation 
action on behalf of its insured against a tort-feasor. . . . More 
significantly, we have extended this principle to an action by an 
insurer against a second insurance company which is primarily 
liable to defend or pay any claims on behalf of its insured but 
which has denied coverage. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Northwestern National Ins. Co., 912 P.2d 983 
(Utah 1996). 
Moreover, Nationwide has a direct obligation to reimburse West American for PIP 
expenses pursuant to section 309(6) of the no-fault statute. Nationwide's duty arises from 
its PIP coverage, not its liability coverage. Nationwide's duty is not derivative, instead it 
is a direct duty owing to West American. 
Because Nationwide's reimbursement obligation arises from its PIP coverage, it 
may not invoke an exclusion contained in its liability coverage even if such an exclusion 
were valid. Because Nationwide's duty is its own duty, its insistence that privity of 
contract has anything to do with the direct right of reimbursement is frivolous. 
(N.J. 1978) (observing that payments should be made to provide compensation to the 
innocent victim of the insured's criminal behavior "so long as the benefit thereof does not 
enure to the assured" and in "furtherance of that justifiable end . . . it is equitable and just 
that the insurer be indemnified by the insured for the payment to the injured party." By 
taking this approach, the court concluded that the "public policy principle . . . that the 
assured may not be relieved of financial responsibility arising out of his criminal act" is 
"honored."). 
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V. WEST AMERICAN AND ITS INSURED ARE THIRD-PARTY 
BENEFICIARIES OF NATIONWIDE'S CONTRACT. 
Automobile insurance is compulsory for the protection of the public. Liability 
insurance is purchased so that the negligent party can provide compensation to victims 
without reducing the negligent party's assets. 
If. . . the promisee's expressed intent is that some third party shall 
receive the performance in satisfaction and discharge of some actual 
or supposed duty or liability of the promisee, the third party is a 
creditor beneficiary. 
Fleck v. National Property Mgt.. Inc., 590 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1979). Because the public is 
expressly intended by the parties to the insurance contract to benefit therefrom,16 the 
Court has held that injured motorists are third-party beneficiaries: 
[Tjhis action may be looked at somewhat differently than it would be 
in a suit between the primary parties to the insurance contract. As a 
member of the public injured by the insured, plaintiff became a 
third-party beneficiary of the policy, but she had no control over 
the conduct of the parties inter se. * * * there exists at least a 
temptation for an insurer to merely go through the motions of 
seeking the insured's cooperation without actually desiring it, and 
thus establish a defense to liability on the policy. * * * Inasmuch 
as the purpose of the insurance is to protect not only the insured, but 
the public generally, the right which arises in anyone injured by an 
insured motorist should not be regarded lightly, nor permitted to be 
subverted by other parties over whom the injured one has no control. 
Peterson v. Western Cas. and Sur. Co., 425 P.2d 769 (Utah 1967) (emphasis added); 
accord Ellis v. Gilbert, 429 P.2d 39 (Utah 1967) ("Another important consideration is the 
16
 West American's legal rights as a third-party beneficiary should be considered 
before its equitable rights. See Knight v. Post, 748 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah App. 1988) 
(explaining that "[a]s a general rule, one must first exhaust his legal remedies before he 
may recover on the basis of the equitable doctrine of quantum meruit."). 
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fact that in passing the Safety Responsibility Act the legislature has indicated as a matter 
of public policy its recognition of the dangers, injury and destruction on our highways, 
from which the public has a right to some measure of protection. When one is so 
injured, he becomes in effect a third-party beneficiary of the insurance of a wrongdoer 
who injures him."). The Court scarcely could have been more precise or clear. 
Nevertheless, the shrill cries of "steps in shoes, clearly" and "privity, clearly" persist 
unabated. 
The Utah Supreme Court (as set forth above) has soundly rejected the idea that the 
benefit of liability coverage provided under mandatory automobile insurance statutes are 
only "incidentally" related to the protection of the public. Because Nationwide's 
insurance policy was issued under Utah law and it is required to comply with the 
Financial Responsibility Act, West American is a third-party beneficiary because 
Nationwide's insurance policy was intended to provide protection to West American's 
insureds as members of the public injured by Nationwide's insureds. 
The foregoing is decisive. Nevertheless, it is instructive to review Utah's common 
law and the tired "steps in shoes, clearly" argument. 
The first line of cases are the cases relied upon by the personal injury defense bar 
to assert the catch phrase "direct-action rule." The most often cited case, Young v. 
Barney, 433 P.2d 846 (Utah 1967), stands for the proposition that an insurer which fulfills 
its obligations to its insured by providing a defense and promising indemnification for 
liability up to its coverage limits should not be joined as a defendant together with its 
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insured. Barney has no application where, as here, the insurance company is refusing to 
involve itself, attempting to abandon its insured, and attempting to shift responsibility for 
its insured's liability to a secondary insurer by baldly refusing to provide coverage to its 
insured. See Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 471 F.Supp. 
1059 (M.D. Penn. 1979) ("a secondary insurer has a cause of action against the primary 
insurer for wrongful refusal to provide coverage. To hold otherwise would put an undue 
strain on [Utah's Financial Responsibility Act] for it would enable the primary insurer to 
impose severe financial burdens on the secondary insurer whose presence is now all but 
inevitable [under modern compulsory insurance] simply by denying the existence of 
coverage."). The other case explaining the direct-action concept is never cited by the 
personal injury defense bar because it sets forth the proper distinction between law-
abiding insurers and miscreant insurers. See Campbell v. Stagg, 596 P.2d 1037 (Utah 
1979) (approving the joinder of the insured and the insurer where both parties had 
committed wrongs against the plaintiff, but noting that situation was not present in the 
action before it). 
In Dairyland Insurance Corp. v. Smith, 646 P.2d 737 (Utah 1982), an insurer 
brought suit to rescind17 an automobile policy due to material misrepresentations made by 
the owner of the policy as to who would drive the vehicle. See State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co. v. Mastbaum, 748 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1987) (interpreting Dairyland). As explained 
17
 "It has been universally held or recognized that an insurer cannot, on the ground 
of fraud or misrepresentations relating to the inception of the policy, retrospectively avoid 
coverage under a compulsory or financial responsibility insurance law so as to escape 
liability to a third party." 7 Am.Jur.2d, Automobile Insurance § 37, p. 493 (1980). 
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above, a third-party beneficiary's rights are not affected by actions taken by the insured 
which violate its duties of performance. However, where the contract never existed, the 
third-party beneficiary's rights never vested; therefore, the third-party beneficiary could 
possess no rights under the contract. Because the Dairyland court was addressing a 
contract which was alleged to be void ab initio, its dictum that the plaintiffs' claim of 
third-party beneficiary status with respect to a contract that is declared to be void from its 
inception "is not the law in this jurisdiction and will not be relied upon by this Court to 
reverse[18] the trial court's decision" makes sense in light of the contrary and well-
explained holding of Peterson. See Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 909 P.2d 271, 276 
(Utah App. 1995) (expressing unwillingness to read case to overrule another sub silentio 
because "the two situations are so different"). 
VI. THE ISSUE OF DEFENDANT FRICKE'S NEGLIGENCE AND 
COMPARATIVE FAULT ARE QUESTIONS FOR THE JURY. 
The issue is not whether the defendant's evidence is sufficient that a jury could 
find that she was not negligent. Undoubtedly, Fricke's affidavit could support such a 
finding. The problem addressed by her motion for summary judgment was whether the 
evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, makes mandatory 
such a finding as a matter of law. 
[WJherever there is a basis from which bias, prejudice or self-interest 
18
 Courts rarely rely on two theories to reverse where one is sufficient. The 
Dairyland court had already found a statutory basis for reversal in favor of the plaintiffs 
before it presented its conclusory refusal to consider the plaintiffs' third-party beneficiary 
arguments. 
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may be seen, or there is anything incredible in the testimony, the jury 
is not obliged to accept it. 
Page v. Federal Security Ins. Co.. 332 P.2d 666 (Utah 1958) (citing Jones v. California 
Packing Corporation. 244 P.2d 640 (Utah 1952). 
It is well settled that negligence is a question of fact. See Dubois v. Grand Central 
872 P.2d 1073, 1076 (Utah App. 1994); Canfield v. Albertsons. Inc.. 841 P.2d 1224, 1227 
(Utah App. 1992). Likewise, the issue of proximate cause is a question of fact. See 
Nelson ex rel. Stuckman v. Salt Lake City. 919 P.2d 568, 574 (Utah 1996). Because 
proximate cause is a factual issue it generally cannot be resolved as a matter of law. 
Apache Tank Lines. Inc. v. Cheney. 706 P.2d 614, 615 (Utah 1985); Godesky v. Provo 
City Corp.. 690 P.2d 541, 544 (Utah 1984); Unigard Ins. Co. v. City of LaVerkin. 689 
P.2d 1344, 1347 (Utah 1984); Thompson v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co.. 688 P.2d 489, 
491 (Utah 1984):Wattersv. Ouerrv. 626 P.2d 455, 457-58 (Utah 1981); Rees v. 
Albertson's. Inc.. 587 P.2d 130, 133 (Utah 1978). The courts must refuse to take the 
issue from the jury if there is any evidence upon which a reasonable jury could infer 
proximate causation of the collision by the action or inaction of Kimberly Fricke. See 
Jensen v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.. 611 P.2d 363, 365 & n.4 (Utah 1980). 
Kimberly Fricke's own affidavit provided ample evidence to permit a jury to 
disbelieve her legal conclusions.19 Ms. Fricke admitted that she was driving the vehicle. 
19
 See State v. Tennev. 913 P.2d 750, 756 (Utah App.), cert denied. 923 P.2d 693 
(Utah 1996) ("[T]hose portions of the expert witnesses' testimony to which [plaintiff] 
objects quite clearly state legal conclusions because the witnesses tie their opinions to the 
requirements of Utah law. Thus, [plaintiff] has established error and that this error should 
have been obvious to the court."). 
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As the driver of the vehicle, she had a duty to maintain control. She admitted that she 
failed to maintain control. The issue, then, is whether a reasonable person would have 
maintained control or whether her breach of duty was excused by an intervening cause. 
This question is addressed by among other things: Keeping a firmer grip on the steering 
wheel; Reducing speed; Braking; Taking evasive action in the same direction if Mr. 
Hiatt's grip was too much for Ms. Fricke (which her affidavit does not address at all), etc. 
In addition, Ms. Fricke had a duty to other drivers on the road to concentrate on 
driving — regardless of her relationship problems. Ms. Fricke testifies in her affidavit 
that she and Mr. Hiatt were arguing. A young woman fighting with her boyfriend is no 
different from a motorist whose cellular telephone takes precedence over the life and limb 
of others who are using the roadways of this state. She was no different from a drunk 
driver whose allegiance to alcohol prevails over competent driving. She was no different 
from a sleep-deprived driver. If the debate with Mr. Hiatt took precedence over Ms. 
Fricke's attention to the road, that cannot be wholly attributed to Mr. Hiatt as a matter of 
law. Only a jury can resolve the varying conclusions that reasonable people could draw. 
Ms. Fricke's own self-serving and bare conclusion20 that "there was nothing I 
could do to prevent the accident from happening" is not conclusive. The jury will be 
instructed to determine whether Ms. Fricke's self-serving conclusions are credible or 
whether, because of her innate bias, she understates her role in causing the collision at 
20
 See Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co.. 972 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1998) ("The 
Walkers assert that Jack Walker referred to the parcels as one tract. This contention 
amounts to little more than Mr. Walker's subjective conclusion that his properties should 
be treated as one unit, i.e., his shopping center."). 
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issue or failing to prevent it or failing to take evasive actions which could have mitigated 
it. The memorandum in support of Ms. Fricke's motion quoted pertinent statements of 
law to the effect that a motion for summary judgment is only appropriate when only one 
inference can be drawn from the facts, but the trial court nevertheless drew a factual 
conclusion when Fricke's motion was granted. 
A jury could quite easily disbelieve the "suddenness" or "unforeseeability" of Mr. 
Hiatt's actions. Moreover, this testimony is in the nature of inadmissible conclusions 
rather than the presentation of specific facts. The jury could also easily disbelieve Ms. 
Fricke's assertion that she was powerless to maintain control of her vehicle. Even the 
"short time span" between the argument and the action which Ms. Fricke claims 
corroborates her other conclusions is simply her self-serving statements which a jury may 
or may not believe. Ms. Fricke's professed "surprise" at Mr. Hiatt's actions are similarly 
conclusions she draws from the facts in the light most favorable to the ultimate 
conclusion she prefers. Such conclusions are not binding and do not preclude other 
different conclusions to be made by the jury. 
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CONCLUSION 
The district court's order should be reversed in its entirety. Judgment should be 
entered in favor of Plaintiffs stating that Nationwide is responsible for the default 
judgment entered against Hiatt. 
DATED this ^ day of July, 2002. 
CARR & WADDOUPS 
WADDOU^S 
attorneys for Plaintiffs / Appellants 
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Q Utah Statutes 
Q TITLE 31A INSURANCE CODE 
Q CHAPTER 22 CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES 
^3 PART III MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE 
[Previous Document in Book] [Next Document in Book] 
31A>-<22>-<303. Motor vehicle liability coverage. 
(1) (a) In addition to complying with the requirements of Chapter 21 
and Part II of Chapter 22, a policy of motor vehicle liability coverage 
under Subsection 31A-22-302 (1) (a) shall: 
(i) name the motor vehicle owner or operator in whose name the policy 
was purchased, state that named insured's address, the coverage 
afforded, the premium charged, the policy period, and the limits of 
liability; 
(ii) (A) if it is an owner's policy, designate by appropriate 
reference all the motor vehicles on which coverage is granted, insure the 
person named in the policy, insure any other person using any named motor 
vehicle with the express or implied permission of the named insured, 
and, except as provided in Subsection (7), insure any person included in 
Subsection (1) (a) (iii) against loss from the liability imposed by law for 
damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of these motor 
vehicles within the United States and Canada, subject to limits exclusive 
of interest and costs, for each motor vehicle, in amounts not less than 
the minimum limits specified under Section 31A-22-304; or 
(B) if it is an operator's policy, insure the person named as insured 
against loss from the liability imposed upon him by law for damages 
arising out of the insured's use of any motor vehicle not owned by him, 
within the same territorial limits and with the same limits of liability 
as in an owner's policy under Subsection (1)(ii)(A); 
(iii) except as provided in Subsection (7), insure persons related to 
the named insured by blood, marriage, adoption, or guardianship who are 
residents of the named insured's household, including those who usually 
make their home in the same household but temporarily live elsewhere, to 
the same extent as the named insured and the available coverage of the 
policy may not be reduced to the persons described in this Subsection 
(1) (a) (iii) because: 
(A) a permissive user driving a covered motor vehicle is at fault in 
causing an accident; or 
(B) the named insured or any of the persons described in this 
Subsection (1) (a) (iii) driving a covered motor vehicle is at fault in 
causing an accident; and 
(iv) cover damages or injury resulting from a covered driver of a 
motor vehicle who is stricken by an unforeseeable paralysis, seizure, or 
other unconscious condition and who is not reasonably aware that 
paralysis, seizure, or other unconscious condition is about to occur to 
the extent that a person of ordinary prudence would not attempt to 
continue driving. 
(b) The driver's liability under Subsection (1)(a)(iv) is limited to 
the insurance coverage. 
(2) (a) A policy containing motor vehicle liability coverage under 
Subsection 31A-22-302(1)(a) may: 
(i) provide for the prorating of the insurance under that policy with 
other valid and collectible insurance; 
(ii) grant any lawful coverage in addition to the required motor 
vehicle liability coverage; 
(iii) if the policy is issued to a person other than a motor vehicle 
business, limit the coverage afforded to a motor vehicle business or its 
officers, agents, or employees to the minimum limits under Section 
31A-22-304, and to those instances when there is no other valid and 
collectible insurance with at least those limits, whether the other 
insurance is primary, excess, or contingent; and 
(iv) if issued to a motor vehicle business, restrict coverage afforded 
to anyone other than the motor vehicle business or its officers, agents, 
or employees to the minimum limits under Section 31A-22-304, and to those 
instances when there is no other valid and collectible insurance with at 
least those limits, whether the other insurance is primary, excess, or 
contingent. 
(b) (i) The liability insurance coverage of a permissive user of a 
motor vehicle owned by a motor vehicle business shall be primary 
coverage. 
(ii) The liability insurance coverage of a motor vehicle business 
shall be secondary to the liability insurance coverage of a permissive 
user as specified under Subsection (2)(b)(i). 
(3) Motor vehicle liability coverage need not insure any liability: 
(a) under any workers' compensation law under Title 34A, Utah Labor 
Code ; 
(b) resulting from bodily injury to or death of an employee of the 
named insured, other than a domestic employee, while engaged in the 
employment of the insured, or while engaged in the operation, 
maintenance, or repair of a designated vehicle; or 
(c) resulting from damage to property owned by, rented to, bailed to, 
or transported by the insured. 
(4) An insurance carrier providing motor vehicle liability coverage 
has the right to settle any claim covered by the policy, and if the 
settlement is made in good faith, the amount of the settlement is 
deductible from the limits of liability specified under Section 31A-22-304 
(5) A policy containing motor vehicle liability coverage imposes on 
the insurer the duty to defend, in good faith, any person insured under 
the policy against any claim or suit seeking damages which would be 
payable under the policy. 
(6) (a) If a policy containing motor vehicle liability coverage 
provides an insurer with the defense of lack of cooperation on the part of 
the insured, that defense is not effective against a third person making 
a claim against the insurer, unless there was collusion between the third 
person and the insured. 
(b) If the defense of lack of cooperation is not effective against the 
claimant, after payment, the insurer is subrogated to the injured 
person's claim against the insured to the extent of the payment and is 
entitled to reimbursement by the insured after the injured third person 
has been made whole with respect to the claim against the insured. 
(7) A policy of motor vehicle liability coverage under Subsection 
31A-22-302(1) may specifically exclude from coverage a person who is a 
resident of the named insured's household, including a person who usually 
makes his home in the same household but temporarily lives elsewhere, 
if: 
(a) at the time of the proposed exclusion, each person excluded from 
coverage satisfies the owner's or operator's security requirement of 
Section 41-12a-301, independently of the named insured's proof of owner's 
or operator's security; 
(b) the named insured and the person excluded from coverage each 
provide written consent to the exclusion; and 
(c) the insurer includes the name of each person excluded from 
coverage in the evidence of insurance provided to an additional insured 
or loss payee. 
(8) A policy of motor vehicle liability coverage may limit coverage to 
the policy minimum limits under Section 31A-22-304 if the insured motor 
vehicle is operated by a person who has consumed any alcohol or any 
illegal drug or illegal substance if the policy or a specifically reduced 
premium was extended to the insured upon express written declaration 
executed by the insured that the insured motor vehicle would not be so 
operated. 
(9) (a) When a claim is brought exclusively by a named insured or a 
person described in Subsection (1)(a)(iii) and asserted exclusively 
against a named insured or an individual described in Subsection 
(1) (a) (iii), the claimant may elect to resolve the claim: 
(i) by submitting the claim to binding arbitration; or 
(ii) through litigation. 
(b) Once the claimant has elected to commence litigation under 
Subsection (9) (a) (ii), the claimant may not elect to resolve the claim 
through binding arbitration under this section without the written 
consent of both parties and the defendant's liability insurer. 
(c) (i) Unless otherwise agreed on in writing by the parties, a claim 
that is submitted to binding arbitration under Subsection (9)(a)(i) shall 
be resolved by a panel of three arbitrators. 
(ii) Unless otherwise agreed on in writing by the parties, each party 
shall select an arbitrator. The arbitrators selected by the parties 
shall select a third arbitrator. 
(d) Unless otherwise agreed on in writing by the parties, each party 
will pay the fees and costs of the arbitrator that party selects. Both 
parties shall share equally the fees and costs of the third arbitrator. 
(e) Except as otherwise provided in this section, an arbitration 
procedure conducted under this section shall be governed by Title 7 8 
Chapter 31a, Utah Arbitration Act, unless otherwise agreed on in writing 
by the parties. 
(f) (i) Discovery shall be conducted in accordance with Rules 26b 
through 36, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(ii) All issues of discovery shall be resolved by the arbitration 
panel. 
(g) A written decision of two of the three arbitrators shall 
constitute a final decision of the arbitration panel. 
(h) Prior to the rendering of the arbitration award: 
(i) the existence of a liability insurance policy may be disclosed to 
the arbitration panel; and 
(ii) the amount of all applicable liability insurance policy limits 
may not be disclosed to the arbitration panel. 
(i) The amount of the arbitration award may not exceed the liability 
limits of all the defendant's applicable liability insurance policies, 
including applicable liability umbrella policies. If the initial 
arbitration award exceeds the liability limits of all applicable 
liability insurance policies, the arbitration award shall be reduced to 
an amount equal to the liability limits of all applicable liability 
insurance policies. 
(j) The arbitration award is the final resolution of all claims 
between the parties unless the award was procured by corruption, fraud, 
or other undue means. 
(k) If the arbitration panel finds that the action was not brought, 
pursued, or defended in good faith, the arbitration panel may award 
reasonable fees and costs against the party that failed to bring, 
pursue, or defend the claim in good faith. 
(1) Nothing in this section is intended to limit any claim under any 
other portion of an applicable insurance policy. 
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Exhibit B 
BARBARA L. MAW #4081 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorney for Defendants 
Nationwide Mutual Insurance 
Co. and Kimberly Kay Fricke 
185 South State Street, Suite 340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 533-9700 
Fax: (801) 533-8111 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
TED JOHN SPEROS and WEST ) ORDER 
AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. 990910670 
KIMBERLY KAY FRICKE, JEFFREY B. ) 
HIATT, and NATIONWIDE MUTUAL ) 
INSURANCE COMPANY, ) Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Defendants. ) 
Plaintiff's Ted John Speros and West American Insurance Company's Motion for 
Summary Judgment came before the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley on March 27, 2000, 
Trent Waddoups appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs, Ted Speros and West American 
Insurance Company; and Barbara L. Maw appearing on behalf of defendants, Kimberly 
Kay Fricke and Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company. No one appearing an behalf of 
^ " D I S T R I C T COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAY 1 6 2000 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By . Z§Q 
Deputy Clerk 
Jeffrey B. Hiatt. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and a memorandum in 
support thereof; defendant filed a response to plaintiffs motion and memorandum. Oral 
argument was requested and heard. After having read the briefs of counsel, having 
heard oral argument and being fully advised in the premises, the Court adopted the 
analysis and authorities set forth in defendant's memorandum in opposition to plaintiff's 
motion for summary Judgment denying plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, finding 
as follows: 
1. A default judgment entered against one party (Hiatt) is not binding on 
another party, nor can the allegations be admitted through a default judgment as against 
another party, in this case, Kimberly Fricke and/or Nationwide Mutual Insurance 
Company. 
2. The Law of the Case Doctrine fundamentally denies defendants Fricke and 
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, if their due process rights does not apply. 
3. Nationwide has no duty to file a declaratory judgment action against 
Mr. Hiatt. 
4. The case of McCarty v. Parks, 564 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977), applicable to 
these facts suggests that defendants Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company and 
Kimberly Fricke have a right to have their own liability assessed. Also, that the Insurance 
Company can determine a matter is not covered and refuse to defend. THEREFORE: 
2 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs, Ted John 
Speros and West American Insurance Company, motion for summary judgment is denied. 
DATED this day of April, 2000. 
"BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
CARR & WADDOUPS 
Y. I A A £ / 7 ? UDGE TYRONE E. MZDQEY 
By: 
Trent J. Waddoups 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of April, 2000, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing was mailed, first-class postage prepaid, to the following: 
Trent J. Waddoups 
CARR & WADDOUPS 
8 East Broadway, Suite 609 
Salt Lake City, UT 54111 
Jeffrey B. Hiatt 
942 South Greenwood Terrace 




FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
BARBARA L. MAW #4081 
BRUCE C. BURT #8453 
Law Offices of Barbara L. Maw, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants Nationwide and Fricke 
185 South State Street, Suite 340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 533-9700 
Fax: (801)533-8111 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TED JOHN SPEROS and WEST 
AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KIMBERLY KAY FRICKE, JEFFREY B. 
HIATT, and NATIONWIDE MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 990910670 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Plaintiff Ted John Speros' Motion to File a Third Party Complaint and Second Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Defendant Nationwide and Kimberly Kay Fricke's Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment came before this Court on June 18, 2001, the honorable Judge Tyrone 
Medley presiding, Trent Waddoups appearing on behalf of Plaintiffs' Ted John Speros and West 
American Insurance Company ("West American") and Barbara L. Maw appearing on behalf of 
Defendants Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company ("Nationwide") and Kimbery Kay Fricke. 
After having read the briefs of the parties and having heard oral argument, the Court, via 
telephone conference call on June 19, 2001 with all parties present by telephone, made the 
following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that Nationwide is a party to the action. U.R.C.P. Rule 14(a) 
applies only to non-parties and, for this reason, Plaintiff is precluded from filing a Third Party 
Complaint against Nationwide. 
(a) The Court further finds that Plaintiff has failed to obtain leave of court to 
file a Third Party Complaint and, for this reason as well, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiffs Third Party Complaint is granted. 
(b) Additionally, the Court finds that third party Plaintiff Hiatt is not an 
insured of West American. Further, that under 31A-21 -108 and the case law cited in 
Defendants' Memorandum, Plaintiff West American cannot "step into the shoes" of the 
adverse party Hiatt. 
(c) The Court also finds that there is no privity of contract between West 
American and Hiatt and that there is also a direct conflict of interest between West 
American and Hiatt, which also precludes West American from "stepping into the shoes" 
of Hiatt. 
2. The Court finds that after reviewing Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support thereof and Defendants' Reply, Plaintiffs Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment is really a request for reconsideration of its First Motion for 
2 
Summary Judgment. To that extent, the Court finds that its order on Plaintiffs First Motion for 
Summary Judgment continues to be the law of this case. 
3. The Court also finds that reconsideration under Rule 54(b) is not applicable for 
the reasons set forth in Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment. More specifically, Plaintiff cannot satisfy the six factors in the Tremble v. 
Mrs. Fields Cookies case. Therefore, the only basis for reconsideration is to find the Court's 
prior ruling is a mistake. In this regard, the Court holds that it is not going to reconsider those 
issues raised in Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary Judgment. 
4. Plaintiffs attempt to file a Rule 60(b) Motion to set aside or correct the judgment 
is untimely as supported by the citations in Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary Judgment. 
5. The Court agrees with Defendants' analysis in its Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary Judgment and finds that Nationwide has no duty to 
indemnify or defend Hiatt and, in fact, has no contractual liability for Hiatt's acts. 
6. The Court also finds that Plaintiff has no standing to assert a claim against 
Nationwide under these facts and circumstances and, as previously ordered, that Nationwide 
Insurance Company is entitled to take the position that Hiatt is not an insured. 
7. The Court grants Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment consistent 
with Defendants' Memorandum in Support and Reply, finding as follows: 
(a) There is no privity of contract between Plaintiffs and Nationwide, so 
neither Plaintiff can step into the shoes of Hiatt and assert any defenses he may have; 
3 
(b) Having concluded that Hiatt is not an insured under the policy, the Court 
finds there is no duty on Nationwide to defend or indemnify Hiatt. 
(c) The Court also concludes that Hiatt is not a permissive user under the facts 
and circumstances presented in this particular case. Further, if he were deemed a 
permissive user, the Court concludes that the Intentional Act Exclusion would preclude 
coverage under the facts and circumstances of this case. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the above Findings of Fact, the Court concludes as follows: 
1. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Third Party Complaint is granted for the 
reasons cited above in that Rule 14(a) does not apply to a party to the action; Hiatt is not an 
insured under the Nationwide policy; West American cannot "step into the shoes" of Hiatt; there 
is no privy of contract between Hiatt and West American; and there is a direct conflict of interest 
between West American and Hiatt. 
2. Plaintiffs Request for a Rule 54(b) reconsideration is denied for the reasons that 
Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the essential elements of the Tremble v. Mrs. Fields Cookies case. 
Furthermore, the only basis for reconsideration is that the Court's prior ruling is a mistake. In 
this regard, the Court finds it is not going to reconsider those issues raised in Plaintiffs Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment, so that motion is denied. 
3. Plaintiffs Rule 60(b) Motion is denied as well for the reason that it is untimely. 
4. Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. As such, 
Nationwide is dismissed as a party to this action. More particularly, the Court finds there is no 
privity between Plaintiffs and Nationwide, so neither Plaintiff can "step into the shoes" of Hiatt 
4 
and assert any defenses he may have. Hiatt is not an insured under the policy, therefore there is 
no duty of Nationwide to defend or indemnify Hiatt. Finally, Hiatt is not a permissive user and, 
if he were a permissive user, the intentional act exclusion would exclude coverage under the facts 
and circumstances of this case. 
Dated this _[ day of 6 
5 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the /ir> day of June, 2001, true and correct copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was mailed, first-class 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Trent J. Waddoups 
CARR & WADDOUPS 
8 East Broadway, Suite 609 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
tbtt J (Wpbjtf 
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BARBARA L. MAW #4081 
BRUCE C. BURT #8453 
Law Offices of Barbara L. Maw, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants Nationwide and Fricke 
185 South State Street, Suite 340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 533-9700 
Fax: (801)533-8111 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TED JOHN SPEROS and WEST 
AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KIMBERLY KAY FRICKE, JEFFREY B. 
HIATT, and NATIONWIDE MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
Based on the Findings of Fact and Cone: 
) ORDER 
) Civil No. 990910670 
) Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
usions of Law made by this Court, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
2. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Third Party Complaint is granted. 
3. Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, dismissing 
Nationwide as a party to this action. 
h Dated this _/_£_ day of 
le Tyrone E. Medley 
istrict Court Judge 
i 
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BARBARA L. MAW #4081 
BRUCE C. BURT #8453 
Law Offices of Barbara L. Maw, P.C. 
185 South State Street, Suite 340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)533-9700 
Fax: (801)533-8111 
Attorneys for Defendants Nationwide and Fricke 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TED JOHN SPEROS and WEST ; 
AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, ; 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs. ] 
KIMBERLY KAY FRICKE, JEFFREY B. ] 
HIATT, and NATIONWIDE MUTUAL ; 
INSURANCE COMPANT, ; 
Defendants. ] 
) ORDER GRANTING KIMBERLY 
) FRICKE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
) JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 990910670 
) Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Defendant Kimberly Kay Fricke' s Motion for Summary Judgment came before the Honorable 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley on December 10,2001, with Bruce Burt appearing on behalf of Defendant 
Kimberly Kay Fricke and Trent Waddoups appearing on behalf of Plaintiffs Ted John Speros and 
West American Insurance Company. 
After having read the motions and memoranda of all parties and having heard oral argument, 
for good cause shown, the Court hereby ORDERS AS FOLLOWS: 
™ « DISTRICT COUflT 
rnird Judicial District 
JAN 1
 5 2002 
Deputy Clerk 
1. The Court grants Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismisses all 
claims against her with prejudice. The Court adopts each and every point raised in Defendant 
Fricke's Memorandum in Support of her Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply Memorandum. 
Specifically, the Court finds as follows: 
a. There are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and Defendant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Defendant filed a properly supported motion for 
summary judgment which was supported by the Affidavit of Kimberly Kay Fricke. 
Plaintiff did not present any evidence (affidavit or otherwise) to refute the allegations 
in Ms. Fricke's affidavit and therefore failed to present any specific facts showing 
that there was a genuine issue for trial. 
b. The Affidavit of Kimberly Kay Fricke presented sufficient, competent, and 
admissible evidence. When the affidavit is read as a whole and in context it is 
descriptive of the events that transpired in the car shortly before the motor vehicle 
accident. Plaintiff only objected to three specific phrases from Ms. Fricke's affidavit 
and the Court finds that these phrases, identified in the Reply Memorandum, are 
"admissible in evidence" as required by rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
c. Plaintiff was not entitled to rest on the bare allegations of negligence in his pleadings 
to defeat the motion for summary judgment and was required to set forth, by affidavit 
or otherwise, specific facts to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial. 
d. Even when viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, Plaintiffs 
various possibilities or theories about what may have happened in the vehicle prior 
to the time Mr. Hiatt grabbed the steering wheel are not supported by the evidence. 
These theories or possibilities are insufficient to defeat Defendant's motion for 
summary judgment. 
e. When the undisputed facts, as set forth in Defendant's Reply Memorandum, are 
viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is but one conclusion that can be 
reached, i.e. Jeffrey Hiatt was the sole and proximate cause of the motor vehicle 
accident. 
f. Plaintiff did not conform to Rule 4-501 (2)(B) of the Rules of Judicial Administration. 
Plaintiff failed to separately state its objection to the disputed facts and separately 
number the disputed facts. Plaintiff failed to identify the numbered sentence or 
sentences of Defendant's facts which Plaintiff believed were disputed. 
g. The Court dismisses all claims against Kimberly Kay Fricke with prejudice and, 
because this was the sole and remaining issue to be decided, the Court hereby 
dismisses Plaintiffs Complaint and all claims contained therein with prejudice. 
DATED this day of December, 2( 
Approved as to Form: 
Trenn. Waddoups 
Attorney for Plaint if] 
